INTRODUCTION
This essay addresses two related questions: is participation by citizens in administrative decision-making constitutionally regulated? And if so, to what extent and in what circumstances? Obviously, answers to these questions may vary from one constitutional system to another. The limited aim of the essay is briefly to survey some of those answers and suggest how they might be explained. I will not attempt to state comprehensively the relevant law of any jurisdiction, but I will draw illustrations and examples from several. Nor (for reasons of space) will I tackle any of the underlying theoretical, empirical and practical questions about the functions, effects, costs and benefits of participation and its constitutional regulation. Nevertheless, the essay's modest objective is worth pursuing in order to provide a clear analytical framework for consideration of such questions. Much of the very large literature on participation does not expressly advert to its constitutional regulation.
Amongst the large themes of political science and political theory of the past halfcentury have been the role of citizens in public affairs, both as individuals and as members of -or represented by -groups; and an associated shift in emphasis from representative government to 'participatory democracy'. Witness the publication by the American Political Science Association in 2008 of a volume of collected essays in its 'Classics' series entitled The Age of Direct Citizen Participation. 1 Among the 'isms' of political theory, liberalism -commonly said to provide the basis for classical notions of representative government -now competes with pluralism, corporatism, republicanism and other participatory ideologies for pride of place in explanations of and prescriptions for the design of public institutions and processes.
The conceptual foundations of modern Western constitutionalism were laid before the advent of universal adult suffrage at a time when public affairs were the business of a tiny elite. A constitution embodies the most basic features of a society's ideas about how it should be run, and is the place to look to assess the depth of its commitment to participation by its citizens in the governance of its affairs. Constitutional practice and interpretation have adapted to universal suffrage in various ways. This essay is concerned with how contemporary ideas about participatory governance are reflected _____________________________________________________________________________________ * Australian National University College of Law. I am very grateful to Geoffrey Lindell, Leighton McDonald, Fiona Wheeler and an anonymous referee for constructive comments on an earlier version of this essay.
Federal Law Review
Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ impliedly, but only expressly. 8 Furthermore, by virtue of its provisions, in case of conflict between EU law and a UK statute, the former will prevail even if the UK statute post-dates the relevant EU law. 9 In Thoburn v Sunderland County Council 10 Laws LJ sought to establish a 'hierarchy' of statutes: 'ordinary' and 'constitutional'. In his opinion, a constitutional statute is one that either 'conditions the legal relationship between citizen and state in some general, overarching manner' or 'enlarges or diminishes the scope of what we would now regard as fundamental … rights.' 11 Besides the European Communities Act, Laws LJ included the Bill of Rights 1689, the Scotland Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998 (amongst others) in the category of constitutional statutes. He expressed the opinion that a constitutional statute could be amended or repealed only by express words or 'by words so specific that the inference of an actual determination [on the part of the legislature] to effect the result contended for was irresistible.' 12 It cannot be said that the approach of Laws LJ represents UK law. However, some judges have been attracted to it. In Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 13 Lord Bingham described the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (UK) as 'in effect a constitution' which the courts ought to interpret 'generously and purposively'. Lord Hoffmann said that the Act should be interpreted against the background of the Belfast Agreement just as the US Constitution is interpreted against the background of the Federalist Papers. 14 However, the issues of amendment and repeal did not arise in this case, and the reasoning of the other Law Lords (both in concurrence and dissent) was less expansive. Whatever the position in a system that lacks a (big-C) Constitution, it is perhaps arguable that the de iure concept of a constitutional statute would sit less easily in a system with such a Constitution because it would tend to undermine the distinction between the Constitution and statutes. 15 Critics of Laws LJ might accuse him of judicial over-reaching. It is one thing, they might say, for a court to create higher law in the process of applying and interpreting a document independently recognised to have constitutional status, but quite another for it to do so by conferring constitutional status on a statute by its own fiat. However, the force of such criticism may be blunted by noting that certain common law 
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323 ____________________________________________________________________________________ principles apparently have the status of higher law ('constitutional common law' we might say) in the sense that they cannot be modified or, at least, displaced by the legislature except by the use of very clear language -expressly, but not impliedly, 16 as it were. An example is the principle that administrative decisions must be open to challenge in the courts. The length to which courts will go in protecting this principle from legislative encroachment is famously illustrated by the decision of the House of Lords in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission. 17 The constitutional significance of this decision can be demonstrated by observing that the technique the court used -of 'purposive construction', effectively reading words into a statute 18 -is also used as an alternative to finding a statutory provision inconsistent with EU law or the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR); 19 and by noting that the High Court of Australia adopted essentially the same reasoning as the House of Lords in order to reconcile an apparently inconsistent statutory provision with s 75(v) of the Australian Constitution and thereby create constitutionally guaranteed access to judicial review. 20 It is equally noteworthy that the common law rules of natural justice (aka 'procedural fairness') are recognised as having fundamental status in Australian law (in the sense that the courts do not allow them to be legislatively excluded except by the use of very clear words) even though (or perhaps because) the Australian Constitution contains no equivalent to the due process provisions of the US Constitution. In the US it is less clear that common law principles that are not rooted in the Constitution can have such fundamental status -an issue that will arise again in the context of the discussion of exclusion of judicial review (in section 5(a) below).
Participation may be constitutionally regulated in two ways -either positively, by being protected and promoted, or negatively, by being restricted. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution provide examples of positive regulation: they protect due process rights. Conversely, the US Supreme Court has restricted access to judicial review by reading the 'case or controversy' clause of Article III of the US Constitution as laying down a standing rule that requires the applicant to show an imminent threat of suffering 'injury in fact' that is fairly traceable to the challenged action and likely to be redressed by a favourable order of the court. 21 We are now in a position to examine how each of the three modes of participation in administrative decision-making is constitutionally regulated. Institutionally defined, administrative decision-making is primarily decision-making by organs of government. However, decisions made by non-governmental entities (NGEs) may also be classified as 'administrative' if governance is understood functionally (in terms of 'public' functions as opposed to 'private' activities) rather than institutionally. Public _____________________________________________________________________________________ 16 Not, at least, unless the implication is 'necessary'. There may be some common law principles that have constitutional status in the stronger sense of being beyond parliamentary control: Bradley, above n 9, 29, 40-1. 
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Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ decision-making by NGEs has greatly increased (or, at least, become much more prominent) in recent decades as a result of contracting-out by governments of the provision of services, and of the adoption of various forms of public-private partnership.
3
Constitutional regulation of popular participation The significance of popular participation as a mode of citizen involvement in administrative decision-making is related to the proportion of administrative decisionmakers who are elected. In the US, the President is the only elected member of the executive branch of government. By contrast, in parliamentary systems the elected component of the executive is much larger. The right to vote may be constitutionally protected, despite the fact that neither the Australian Constitution nor the US Constitution (for instance) expressly affirms the principle of universal adult suffrage. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution (1971) seems to assume that principle by prohibiting abridgment, on account of age, of the right to vote of citizens over the age of 18. 22 In Roach v Electoral Commissioner 23 the High Court of Australia held that the principle of universal adult suffrage is implicit in the scheme of representative government established by the Australian Constitution, and that any qualification of the principle must be reasonably compatible with that scheme. In New Zealand, the right of adult suffrage enjoys de facto constitutional protection by virtue of s 12 of BORA. In the UK voting is regulated by statute. However, under Article 3 of the First Protocol to the ECHR, States undertake to 'hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot'. 24 Anyway, it is unlikely that courts would allow the legislature to abridge the right of adult citizens to vote in any but marginal respects and only by the very clearest language.
4
Constitutional regulation of contributory participation Contributory participation may be 'dispositive' or 'propositive'. 25 Dispositive contributory participation involves exercise of a decision-making power, whereas propositive contributory participation involves making arguments to a decision-maker for or against a particular decision. In the theoretical literature, 'participation' typically refers to propositive contributory participation. The significance of dispositive contributory participation as a separate category of participation has become clear as a result (in the last few decades) of increasing allocation of 'public' functions to NGEs.
(a)
Dispositive contributory participation Constitutional provisions (in the broad sense of higher law) are centrally concerned with 'state action' (to adopt US terminology), and constitutionalism is centrally concerned with limitation (or, more broadly, regulation) of state action. On the other As in the saying, 'Man proposes but God disposes', which is attributed to Thomas à Kempis in The Imitation of Christ.
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Participation and Constitutionalism 325 ____________________________________________________________________________________ hand, the phenomenon of performance by NGEs of functions that, according to some, could also appropriately be performed by government organs (GOs) and, according to others, should be performed by GOs, is by no means modern, although it has become much more widespread in recent decades. Conversely, the question, whether there are particular functions that are inappropriate for governments to perform, has long been debated. To what extent is allocation to the private sector of the performance of particular functions constitutionally regulated? In particular, are there any functions that, constitutionally, belong exclusively to the public sector? In other words, are there any functions (and, more particularly for present purposes, any decision-making powers) that the state is constitutionally prohibited from transferring or delegating to the private sector?
We should note, first, that in terms of the traditional analysis of government structures, our concern is with 'administration', not legislating or judging. There seems no doubt that the power to make primary (as opposed to subordinate) legislation constitutionally belongs exclusively to the (complex) GO called 'the legislature'. 26 Similarly, it seems fundamental to the very idea of constitutionalism that judicial power (in its fullest sense, at least) must be exercised by GOs. 27 In both Australia and the US, for instance, the 'judicial power of the state' may be exercised only by a subset of the GOs that exercise 'judicial power' in a broader sense of 'adjudication', namely courts established under the Constitution (Article III courts in the US and Chapter III courts in Australia). 28 The legislative and judicial functions (so defined) seem intrinsic to the very idea of a state, understood as an entity that claims a monopoly of legitimate force.
Pursuing this line of thought, one might ask whether there are any 'administrative' or 'executive' tasks 29 so intrinsic to the idea of a state, so understood, that their transfer It might be expected that the 'independent and impartial tribunal established by law' required by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights would be a body staffed by persons acting as public officials. In Heald v Brent London Borough Council [2009] EWCA Civ 930 the English Court of Appeal held that contracting out to an NGE of the function of reviewing decisions made by council employees about entitlement to council housing did not infringe Article 6. This decision was made on the basis that the decision-maker was sufficiently 'independent and impartial'. It was merely assumed that an NGE could be a 'tribunal established by law'. The word 'court' is used twice in Art 6, which might suggest that the Article requires a hearing before a GO. However, the context seems to be the trial of criminal charges, a function widely considered to lie at the very core of judicial power: eg, Lane v Morrison (2009) 239 CLR 230. 28 There seems to be no general objection to conferral on the executive, or even on NGEs, of judicial power in the broader sense. This would support a broad interpretation of 'tribunal' in Art 6 of the ECHR (see previous note). However, the line between the two senses of judicial power is by no means clear. 29 This word is used in contrast with 'powers' or 'functions'. Much administration involves legislation (rule-making) and adjudication, which are generally referred to as 'powers' or
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Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ to the private sector would be constitutionally barred? Tasks that arguably meet this description are the maintenance and command of a standing army, and the conduct of relations with other states. For instance, it seems at least arguable that the US President could not cede the role of Commander in Chief to the CEO of a private security firm. 30 There may be some tasks -such as law enforcement -in relation to which a constitutional prohibition on privatisation would attach not to the task itself but to regulation of conduct of the task. For instance, although principles and practices of constitutionalism seem generally not to prohibit contracting-out of the management of prisons to private security firms, 31 there might be a constitutional requirement that the state should retain a minimum of control over the prison system. In theoretical terms, we might think that the very idea of a Constitution presupposes at least a minimal concept of the state (as a 'nightwatchman' perhaps) that imposes limits on the extent of participation and involvement of NGEs in making decisions about how a society should and will run.
(b)
Propositive contributory participation As has already been noted, the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution have been interpreted as guaranteeing a minimum of participation by individual citizens in the making of administrative decisions that deprive persons of 'life, liberty or property'. So far as property interests are concerned, the landmark development was the decision of the US Supreme Court in Goldberg v Kelly, 32 which extended the notion of 'property' from interests traditionally protected under that rubric by the common law to statutory benefits such as social security payments. In the US, procedural requirements imposed on administrative decisionmakers, both by statute (notably under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)) and by the Constitution (under the due process clause) are understood primarily as constraints on decision-makers that 'can serve both an agency's own goals and the goals of governmental institutions charged with responsibility to control the exercise of discretion by the agency -Congress, the Judiciary and the President'. 33 This approach reflects the ideas that the main function of a Constitution is to limit and control the exercise of public power, and that the fundamental principle for the design of _____________________________________________________________________________________ 'functions'. Here, our concern is with 'tasks' -such as welfare and regulation -to the performance of which such powers or functions contribute.
30
The Appointments Clause of the US Constitution may provide a peg on which to hang some control of privatisation of executive functions: Jack M Beermann, 'Privatization and Political Accountability ' (2001) Participation and Constitutionalism 327 ____________________________________________________________________________________ governmental institutions is 'checks and balances': dispersing political power by setting co-ordinate institutions in competition (or, at least, tension) with one another. According to this way of thinking, divided and weak government is the best guarantee of individual freedom.
As we have also noted, the common law principles of procedural fairness have foundational status in parliamentary systems such as the UK and Australia. However, the focus of procedural fairness is on the protection of the individual rights and personal interests of citizens from undue encroachment by government. This understanding of administrative procedure as a matter of fundamental, individual right (as opposed to institutional design) is reflected in Article 6 of the ECHR which guarantees 'a fair … hearing … before an independent and impartial tribunal' in any case involving 'determination of … civil rights and obligations'. 34 According to this conception, protection of the individual depends not on keeping government (the legislature and the executive, in particular) divided and relatively weak but rather on giving citizens strong, 35 judicially enforceable procedural rights against the executive as a counterweight to the power it derives from its integration with and substantial control over the legislature. 36 That having been said, it must immediately be observed that the reach of constitutional principles of due process and procedural fairness is significantly limited -in the US, for instance, by the principle that the due process clause does not apply to 'rule-making', as opposed to 'adjudication' (ie decision-making in individual cases); 37 and in the UK, for instance, by the principle that the rules of natural justice do not apply to delegated legislating. 38 One (and perhaps the dominant) rationale for this limitation is pragmatic: because the rules of due process and procedural fairness protect individuals, they are unsuitable for the making of decisions that affect large numbers of individuals and no individual significantly more than any other. Giving each individual affected by a general rule the right fairly to be heard before the rule was made would (so the argument goes) place intolerable burdens on administrative rule-makers and unacceptably slow the rule-making process.
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 34
Article 6 also deals with trial of criminal charges. In this essay I have not attempted to deal with administrative decision-making in the criminal justice system. 35 For instance, the fair hearing required by natural justice must be available before the decision is made whereas due process may be satisfied by a post-decision hearing. 36 This interpretation of the conceptual foundation of due process and procedural fairness respectively, is not the only possible understanding of their relationship. For instance, it may be that due process is more rigorously outcome-oriented and instrumental than procedural fairness: see, eg, D J Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedure: A Study of Administrative Procedures (1996) ch 6; Rubin, above n 33, 1102-4. If so, it might be less informed by the value of participation. 
Bi-Metallic Investment Co v State Board of Equalization, 239 US 441 (1915).
In US public law, 'adjudication' is used in a very wide sense, encompassing not only dispute resolution and review of primary decision-making but all administrative activity other than rule-making. 38 
Bates v Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone and others [1972] 1 WLR 1373; G J Craven, 'Legislative Action by Subordinate Authorities and the Requirement of a Fair Hearing' (1988) 16
Melbourne University Law Review 569, 570. A party may acquire a 'legitimate expectation' of being consulted before a rule is made, but this is a very fragile, non-constitutional common law protection: Peter Cane, Administrative Law (4 th ed, 2004) 170-1. Of course, there is no bright line between rule-making and legislating on the one hand and administering on the other.
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Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Theoretically the limitation of due process to 'adjudication' associates it with liberalindividualistic understandings of the relationship between governors and governed and it fits more easily with the approach that views administrative procedure as a matter of individual right than with the alternative institutional-design approach. 39 Indeed, it was particularly in the context of rule-making by US regulatory agencies that the understanding of 'administrative procedures as instruments of political control' 40 (by the legislature of the executive with the assistance of the courts) was developed. This helps to explain 41 why administrative rule-making is much more heavily regulated by statute and common law in the US system than in parliamentary systems, thus giving many more opportunities for both participatory and contestatory participation. Moreover, under the APA, the procedure for 'formal' rule-making is modelled on court procedure, and that for 'informal' rule-making ('notice and comment') has been developed by the courts to impose burdens of consultation and justification (reason-giving) just as onerous as those imposed by the constitutional rules of due process on much adjudication, leading -it has often been said -to 'ossification' of the rule-making process. 42 Technically, the APA is an ordinary piece of congressional legislation. However, there may be an argument for classifying it as a de facto constitutional statute -as what William Eskridge and John Ferejohn call a 'super statute' or 'quasi-constitutional law'. 43 The APA certainly has foundational status in US administrative law. Indeed, one commentator has dubbed it 'the Magna Charta [sic] for the administrative state.' 44 Although some new provisions have been added to the APA since its enactment, its original provisions have been remarkably immune from amendment. On the other hand, the provisions of the APA dealing with administrative rule-making procedure are brief and lacking in detail, especially compared with those concerned with administrative adjudication. Most of the law regulating rule-making procedure is found in statutes (such as those conferring powers on individual government agencies) that could not plausibly be described as quasi-constitutional, and in common law accretions to the APA to which there is no basis in theory or practice for according quasi-constitutional status. In terms of the isms of political theory, the prevailing view of the proper role of constitutional principles in regulating propositive citizen participation in administrative decision-making is liberal, not pluralist or corporatist or republican, focused on individuals and on individual rights and interests, not on groups or on collective interests and causes.
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 39
On the other hand, if due process were understood as being more rigorously concerned than procedural fairness with ensuring the proper application of (existing) law (see above n 36), it would be easier to explain why it does not apply to rule-making and correspondingly more difficult to explain the inapplicability of procedural fairness. Other possible explanations include a greater belief in the possibility of apolitical expertise in administration and the lesser involvement of elected officials in rule-making in the US system than in parliamentary systems.
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Given the fundamental and pervasive importance of administrative rule-making in contemporary societies, its effective constitutional invisibility is noteworthy and not without practical significance. Consider, for instance, the modern history of agency rule-making in the US. 45 Because of the onerous nature of formal and informal rulemaking procedure, agencies have increasingly turned to techniques of establishing and announcing general policy that do not attract the procedural requirements of the APA. The great advantage of this move for agencies is that, unlike rule-making that falls within the APA, rule-making beyond its purview is burdened only with such legal requirements as the agency's empowering statute imposes. The disadvantage is that rules that do not fall within the APA lack the legal force of rules that do (the latter being commonly called 'regulations') -although the practical effect of such rules is often indistinguishable from that of regulations. There are, as would be expected, ongoing debates, many disputes and a difficult body of law about the precise reach of the APA provisions and the effect of particular rules made without compliance with the APA.
The complex body of US common law regulating administrative rule-making (informal rule-making in particular), which was developed from the 1970s onwards in response to an explosion of agency rule-making activity, can be understood in terms of the shift in thinking about the relationship between government and governed (noted at the beginning of this essay) from representation to participation. 46 As the earlier discussion of popular participation demonstrates, basic principles of representative democracy -such as free and fair elections, universal adult suffrage and, we might add, 'parliamentary due process' 47 -have constitutional status. Basic concepts of participatory democracy -such as publicity, consultation (and, perhaps, deliberation) and rationality (reason-giving) 48 -are, in most systems, 49 yet to attain such status and it is an open question whether they ever will.
5
Constitutional regulation of contestatory participation Contestation was well-established as a mode of citizen participation in administrative decision-making long before the 'participatory turn' in political theory and practice in That is, the minimum procedural requirements for enactment of primary legislation, of which the law of administrative rule-making procedure may be understood as a counterpart. 48 These are the main components of 'informal', 'notice and comment' rule-making procedure laid down in the APA and elaborated by the courts. 
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Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ the second half of the 20 th century. The 21 st -century buzz-words are 'accountability' 50 and 'administrative justice'. The 'administrative justice system' is an increasingly dense and complex network of mechanisms and institutions that provide varied opportunities for the governed to hold governors to account -not only in courts and tribunals but also, for instance, by way of 'internal review', or complaint to an ombudsman or other complaint-handler. A major pre-occupation of administrative lawyers for the past decade and more has been the impact of various forms of privatisation and out-sourcing on accountability for the conduct of activities and the provision of services. More recently, with the proliferation of opportunities for contestation, policy-makers have become increasingly concerned with the structure of the 'accountability sector' and with facilitating 'access to administrative justice'. 51 Much of the administrative justice system is below the constitutional radar. Not surprisingly, it is the role of superior courts that is most regulated by constitutional rules and principles.
(a)
Contestation in courts In the administrative justice system the basic role of the courts is to ensure that administrative decision-makers comply with 'the law', whether contained in a Constitution, primary or secondary legislation, or the common law. This they do by way of 'judicial review' of, and appeals from, administrative decisions. Such appeals are typically limited to points of law and, therefore, functionally equivalent to judicial review. Courts also provide a forum for liability claims against public authorities -in contract and tort, for instance.
Section 75(v) of the Australian Constitution confers on the High Court of Australia (original) jurisdiction to award injunctions and to issue writs of prohibition and mandamus against 'officers of the Commonwealth', thus creating a constitutionally guaranteed minimum of judicial review applicable as much to situations that do not, as to those that do, raise a constitutional issue. 52 The US Constitution confers no such jurisdiction on the US Supreme Court, which, as a consequence, conducts judicial review -to all intents and purposes -only at the appellate level. 53 The juridical significance of this difference is found in the approach to 'privative clauses' -that is, statutory provisions that purport to exclude (or 'oust') judicial review. In Australia, a clause that purported to oust the judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court would be unconstitutional and invalid no matter how clearly and unambiguously drafted. In the US, the Supreme Court recognises a presumption in favour of judicial review, but its strength -at least in cases that raise no constitutional issue -is unclear because its basis is uncertain. In the absence of express words in the Constitution, recourse may be had to a supposed common law foundation on which the Constitution is built and which, on one view, can supply presuppositions of constitutional force about the role of courts in the system of governance. 54 In English law there is a strong common law right of access to the courts, one effect of which is to make it extremely difficult, both legally 55 and politically, for the legislature to oust judicial review. 56 This right is backed up by Article 6 of the ECHR. In relation to administrative decision-making, however, access to judicial review may not be necessary (or sufficient) to satisfy the requirements of Article 6 57 which, therefore, may not prevent legislative ouster of judicial review. In New Zealand, s 27(2) of BORA confers a right to apply for judicial review. There has been little judicial consideration of this provision. As a result, the precise meaning of 'judicial review' is unclear, and it has not been decided whether the provision is 'self-executing' in the sense that it creates a right to judicial review by its own force or, by contrast, reinforces such a right recognised by statute or common law. 58 This latter uncertainty would seem to have implications for the approach of New Zealand courts to the interpretation of privative clauses, which has been described as generally 'hostile'. 59 As noted earlier, the United States Supreme Court has read a constitutional restriction of access to judicial review into the words 'cases and controversies' in Article III of the Constitution. The relevant case law on standing is complex and controversial 60 partly because of the constitutional status of the restriction and the _____________________________________________________________________________________ 54
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Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ associated distinction the Court draws between this constitutional restriction and other 'prudential' (non-constitutional) restrictions of standing. The equivalent, in the Australian Constitution, to the phrase 'cases and controversies' is the term 'matter'. 'There can be no matter … unless there is some immediate right, duty or liability to be established by the determination of the Court'. 61 It might seem to follow that an applicant without such an interest would lack standing. However, the rules of standing, both in cases that raise constitutional issues and cases that do not, have developed independently of the concept of 'matter', and the relationship between the two is somewhat obscure. 62 In another respect, however, the role of federal (Chapter III) courts in the administrative justice system is fastidiously regulated by the Australian Constitution. The High Court has read out of (or in to) the architecture of the first three Chapters of the Constitution (dealing respectively with the legislature, the executive and the judiciary) a strict separation of judicial power from executive and legislative power. The basic rule is that no organ of the federal government may perform both judicial and non-judicial functions. Because an important criterion of whether a body is judicial or non-judicial is the judicial or non-judicial nature of its functions, it follows that judicial functions may not be conferred on a non-judicial body, and conversely that non-judicial functions may not be conferred on a judicial body (except to the extent that they are incidental to the performance of judicial functions). The latter rule has given rise to a categorical distinction between judicial review (a judicial function) and merits review (a non-judicial function). 63 Courts may not review the 'merits' of administrative decisions, but only their 'legality'. In other words, in Australian federal law, the concept of legality (along with the associated concept of jurisdiction) imposes a limit not only on executive power but also on judicial power. As a result, federal courts play a significantly lesser role as forums for contestatory participation than courts in the UK, for instance, where the grounds of judicial review intrude at various points into what the High Court would call 'the merits' of administrative decisions. 64 The other mode of contestatory participation in which courts play a central role is the making of claims of liability against public authorities. In Australian federal law, the liability of public authorities is regulated chiefly by statute and (non-constitutional) common law. Indeed, in Kruger v Commonwealth Brennan CJ said that if government action or inaction attracts no liability 'under the general law', 'no liability in damages … is imposed on the government by the Constitution'. 65 By contrast, in many other systems damages may be available for breach of constitutional provisions and _____________________________________________________________________________________
61
In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257, 265.
62
Participation and Constitutionalism 333 ____________________________________________________________________________________ infringement of constitutional rights. This is so, for instance, in New Zealand, 66 Canada, 67 the UK 68 and the US. 69 However, such rights to claim damages may be understood as being based on statute or non-constitutional common law principles, and may not be constitutionally entrenched. In general, there seems to be greater resistance to constitutionalising damages liability than to constitutionalising judicial review. 70 
(b)
Other modes of contestation We have already noted that the Australian Constitution has been interpreted as preventing the conferral of merits review jurisdiction on federal courts. Such jurisdiction must be conferred on non-judicial bodies (called tribunals), which cannot perform judicial functions. Most significantly, 'merits review' tribunals cannot 'conclusively' decide issues of law (ie they cannot 'make law'), and they cannot enforce their decisions. 71 By contrast, in the UK -at least since the report of the Franks Committee on Tribunals and Enquiries in 1957 72 -tribunals have been treated as part of 'the machinery of justice'; and it is probably not going too far to say that as a result of changes introduced by the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (UK), courts and tribunals (as components of the administrative justice system) are now understood to be species of the same genus (of administrative adjudicators) that perform essentially similar functions. 73 So, for example, decisions of tribunals on issues of law can have precedential force. 74 In the US, while the equivalents of administrative tribunals (administrative law judges (ALJs) and administrative judges) do not exercise 'the judicial power of the United States' (which only Article III courts can do), they are understood to be repositories of judicial power in a broader sense. There may be some functions that can be conferred only on an Article III court. For example, it seems that ALJs cannot 'make law'. Conversely, however, the general view seems to be that within their constitutionally permitted jurisdiction, non-court administrative adjudicators perform no function that could not be conferred on an Article III court.
